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TOO NARROW OF A HOLDING? HOW—AND 
PERHAPS WHY—CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 
TURNED SNYDER V. PHELPS INTO AN EASY CASE 
CLAY CALVERT* 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s March 2011 
decision in Snyder v. Phelps.  Specifically, it demonstrates the narrow 
nature of the holding, and argues that while narrow framing, in the tradition 
of judicial minimalism, may have been a strategic move by Chief Justice 
John Roberts to  obtain a decisive eight-justice majority, the resulting 
opinion failed to advance First Amendment jurisprudence significantly.  
Instead, the outcome simply—even predictably—fell in line with an 
established order of decisions.  This article examines four tactics employed 
by the Chief Justice to narrow the case in such a way that its outcome was 
essentially predetermined.  This article relies on the works of Professors 
Frederick Schauer and Cass Sunstein, among others, in its analysis of issues 
related to Roberts’ judicial minimalism in Snyder.   
Introduction 
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its March 2011 
ruling in the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) funeral-protest case of 
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Snyder v. Phelps,1 Chief Justice John Roberts aptly characterized the 
holding by the eight-justice majority as “narrow.”2  Only Justice Samuel 
Alito declined to join the eight-justice majority.3  Likewise, in the 
preceding term, Justice Alito was the sole dissenter in the First 
Amendment4 case of United States v. Stevens,5 which centered on a federal 
statute6 targeting so-called “crush videos.”7   
Having relegated Alito to the role of free-speech squelcher, Chief Justice 
Roberts, who also authored the majority opinion in Stevens, proved once 
again in Snyder to be capable of fashioning a nearly-unanimous decision 
protecting distasteful expression.8  This article argues, however, that Chief 
Justice Roberts avoided multiple interesting and complex issues in Snyder.  
The result oversimplified the case, making the outcome, in layperson’s 
terms, a no-brainer9 which merely followed in a long line of other cases 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 1220.  
 3. Alito’s dissent in Snyder has been described in the news media as “blistering.”  
Robert Knight, High Cost of Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at B1.  It also has 
been called “passionate.”  Peter St. Onge, Court Protects Right to Remain Hateful, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 6, 2011, at B1.  Finally, it has been characterized as 
“muscular.” Robert Barnes, Alito Stands Alone on Supreme Court First Amendment Cases, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011, at A2.  In brief, Justice Alito did not go down meekly. 
  For instance, Justice Alito opened his dissent by asserting that “[o]ur profound 
national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault 
that occurred in this case.”  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).  He contended 
that of the multiple justifications the majority gave for protecting the speech of the WBC 
members, “none is sound.”  Id. at 1226.  He concluded his dissent by opining that “the Court 
now compounds” the injuries sustained by petitioner Albert Snyder and that “[i]n order to 
have a society in which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not 
necessary to allow the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner.”  Id. at 1229. 
 4. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated eighty-six 
years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties 
which apply to state and local government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 7. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583 (explaining that crush videos often “feature the 
intentional torture and killing of helpless animals, including cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and 
hamsters” by women in high-heeled shoes).   
 8. In Stevens, Justice John Paul Stevens joined Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion.  
Id. at 1582.  After Justice Stevens retired, he was replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, who 
joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Snyder.  Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1212. 
 9. As one newspaper editor characterized it, “in terms of law, the case is easy, or at 
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protecting offensive expression about matters of public concern.10  As 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the University of California, Irvine School of 
Law, told the Wall Street Journal shortly after the Snyder opinion was 
issued, “the core of the First Amendment has always been that speech can’t 
be punished or held liable because it is offensive.  Had the court come out 
the other way, it would have dramatically changed First Amendment 
law.”11 
In other words, the Snyder opinion did little to advance First Amendment 
jurisprudence and the result was no surprise to First Amendment scholars.12  
Viewed cynically, the opinion merely provided the members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church with yet another opportunity to gain more of the 
media attention that they crave.13  Was the “narrow”14 holding in Snyder 
thus too narrow?  Did the Court squander an opportunity to examine critical 
issues in its delivery of a victory for free speech?  This article addresses 
these questions. 
                                                                                                                 
least eight justices thought so.”  Marc Charisse, Nothing to Fear From Phelps and Gang, 
EVENING SUN (Hanover, Pa.), Mar. 5, 2011, at Opinion. 
 10. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (upholding the First Amendment right of 
citizens to burn the American flag at a public venue as a form of symbolic political 
expression against the policies of the Reagan administration); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (protecting the First Amendment right to mock public figures’ 
religious beliefs and sexual practices with parodic, rhetorical hyperbole in the face of a cause 
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 
17 (1971) (protecting the right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” 
in a public courthouse in order to criticize the draft and the war in Vietnam). 
 11. Brent Kendall, First Amendment Protects “Hurtful” Speech, Court Says, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 3, 2011, at A1. 
 12. See Nina Totenberg, High Court Rules for Anti-Gay Protestors at Funerals (Nat’l 
Pub. Radio broadcast Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/1341 
94491/high-court-rules-for-military-funeral-protesters (stating that the Court’s “8-to-1 ruling 
came as no surprise to First Amendment scholars, both right and left.  They note that the 
decision is in line with many court decisions protecting the rights of fringe groups—from 
Nazis marching in Skokie, Ill., to flag burners at a Republican convention in Texas,” and 
adding that “University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone notes that Wednesday’s 
ruling fits neatly into that tradition, calling it a ‘classic case.’  The only surprise, maintained 
Stone, was that anyone dissented.” (emphasis added)). 
 13. See Jeff Brumley, Court Backs ‘Offensive’ Protests at G.I. Funerals, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Jacksonville), Mar. 3, 2011, at A-1 (quoting WBC member and attorney Margie 
Phelps as responding to the Supreme Court’s ruling by stating “[o]ur reaction is thank God 
and praise his name.  He has a message for this nation, and from the Pentagon on down, 
you’re not going to be able to fight it,” and quoting her as thanking Albert Snyder for 
“putting a megaphone to the mouth of this little church”). 
 14. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
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Part I provides a brief overview of the facts and lower court decisions 
leading to Snyder v. Phelps.  Part II illustrates four ways in which the 
majority opinion in Snyder avoided issues that it might have addressed but 
for the goal of narrowly framing the issue before it. Part III argues that 
Chief Justice Roberts may have squandered an opportunity to develop First 
Amendment jurisprudence in order to obtain an eight-justice majority.  In 
its pursuit of judicial minimalism, the Court failed to provide guidance to 
lower courts on issues that are likely to arise again in the near future, such 
as personal, Internet-posted attacks targeting private figures that give rise to 
tort causes of action.  Part III also briefly examines Justice Alito’s 
dissenting opinions in Snyder and Stevens, and contrasts them with his 
earlier majority opinion at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
in another case involving offensive expression.  This article concludes with 
part IV. 
I. Pitting Free Speech Against Emotional Tranquility and Privacy:  
An Overview of Snyder v. Phelps 
 
The Westboro Baptist Church “is a 75-member congregation comprised 
largely of the family members of the church’s founder, Fred Phelps.”15  
Although it is small, the Kansas-based WBC had garnered widespread 
media attention due to its members’ controversial beliefs and actions long 
before the Supreme Court ruled in Snyder.16 
In her initial brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the 
WBC, attorney Margie J. Phelps succinctly explained the WBC’s fringe 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Byron Williams, Court Got Ruling Right, Even Though Results Are Disgusting, 
CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Mar. 5, 2011, at Opinion 1. 
 16. For instance, several years prior to the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Snyder, the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s beliefs and actions were covered by major newspapers in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to 
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14 (describing the WBC as “a tiny fundamentalist 
splinter group” and noting that its members have “been showing up at the funerals of 
soldiers with their telltale placards, chants and tattered American flags.  The protests, viewed 
by many as cruel and unpatriotic, have set off a wave of grass-roots outrage and a flurry of 
laws seeking to restrict demonstrations at funerals and burials”); Kari Lydersen, 5 States 
Consider Bans On Protests at Funerals, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2006, at A9 (observing in the 
lead paragraph that the WBC’s members “have been protesting at funerals of Iraq war 
casualties because they say the deaths are God's punishment for U.S. tolerance toward 
gays”); Jim Herron Zamora, Anti-Gay Protesters Opposed by 20 Times as Many Locals, S.F. 
CHRON., June 12, 2005, at A18 (describing how members of the WBC “travel around the 
nation to picket events and denounce gays”).  
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beliefs and practice of exploiting the funerals of American soldiers killed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 
[G]iven the very public nature of the soldiers’ funerals, and the 
vast dialogue held in connection with their lives and deaths; and 
given the strong religious belief held by respondents that the 
soldiers were dying for the sins of America; in June 2005 
respondents and other members of Westboro Baptist Church 
(WBC) began picketing in proximity to these funerals and 
memorial services.  WBC’s picketing has spanned nearly twenty 
years, starting in early 1991, and has addressed the morality of 
this nation and the consequences of proud institutionalized sin, 
including homosexuality (including same-sex marriage), 
fornication, adultery (including divorce and remarriage, called 
adultery by the Lord Jesus Christ), murder (especially of unborn 
babies), greed, and idolatry.17 
The expression of these beliefs and tactics near the March 2006 funeral 
in Westminster, Maryland for Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was 
killed in Iraq earlier that month, gave rise to a civil lawsuit filed by the 
deceased’s father, Albert Snyder.18  The lawsuit sought monetary damages 
against members of the WBC on several tort causes of action.19  The case 
soon caught the attention of the mainstream news media.20   
Seven members of the WBC were present near the Snyder funeral.  As 
described in the Supreme Court’s opinion: 
The picketing took place within a 10- by 25-foot plot of public 
land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary fence.  That 
plot was approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the 
funeral was held. Several buildings separated the picket site from 
the church.  The Westboro picketers displayed their signs for 
about 30 minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-7512). 
 18. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-73 (D. Md. 2006) (setting forth the 
underlying facts that gave rise to the case). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Rob Hotakainen, Court Case Tests Limits of Free Speech for Phelps 
Family, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 30, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the lawsuit); Melody Simmons, 
Marine’s Father Sues Church for Cheering Son’s Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A18 
(reporting on the lawsuit). 
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recited Bible verses.  None of the picketers entered church 
property or went to the cemetery.21 
The signs carried that day by members of the WBC conveyed messages 
such as “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” 
and “You’re Going to Hell.”22   
In October 2007, a jury found for Albert Snyder on causes of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)23 and intrusion into 
seclusion.24  Mr. Snyder was awarded a combined $10.9 million in 
compensatory and punitive damages.25  In February 2008, U.S. District 
Judge Richard D. Bennett affirmed the jury’s verdict, but reduced the 
amount of punitive damages from $8 million to $2.1 million.26  In 
September 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
overturned the verdict, holding that “the judgment attaches tort liability to 
constitutionally protected speech.”27   
The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in March 
2010,28 and heard oral argument in October 2010.29  The Court issued its 
decision in March 2011, nearly five years after the date of Matthew 
Snyder’s funeral.30 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213 (citations omitted). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Intentional infliction of emotional distress typically “consists of four elements: (1) 
the defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous 
and intolerable, (3) the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and 
(4) the distress must be severe.”  Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts:  Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 
(2000). 
 24. See generally JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 373-75 (4th ed. 
2010) (providing a concise overview of the intrusion tort). 
 25. Rob Hotakainen, Jurors Award Father Nearly $11 Million in Suit Against Phelpses, 
KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 1, 2007, at A1. 
 26. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 27. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 28. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). 
 29. See Tricia Bishop, Protest’s Boundaries: Westboro Case Presents Court with Issues 
of Speech, Religion, Decency, BALT. SUN, Oct. 7, 2010, at 1A (reporting on the oral 
argument in Snyder). 
 30. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1207.   
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II. Eliminating Ambiguity, Focusing Narrowly: Four Ways the Roberts’ 
Majority Stripped Away or Avoided Complex Issues in Snyder 
The Court’s narrow holding in Snyder avoided the consideration of a 
quartet of difficult issues.  They include: 1) the underlying tort claims; 2) 
the offensive material posted on WBC’s website; 3) the private figure status 
of the plaintiff; and 4) an undue emphasis on the public content of the 
speech.  While perfectly permissible, the Court’s narrowing tactics 
eviscerated the case and crafted an opinion that failed to break any new 
ground. 
In addition to the four points described below, the Court also did not 
address the constitutionality of an increasing number of buffer-zone statutes 
enacted by government entities across the country to keep protestors a 
specified distance away from the location of a funeral.31  The Court’s 
decision not to address such statutes, however, is understandable because 
Snyder focused on a different issue, namely tort causes of action seeking 
monetary compensation for the emotional harm allegedly caused by the 
WBC.  Furthermore, Maryland did not have a buffer-zone statute at the 
time of the Matthew Snyder funeral protest.32  Thus, to the extent that WBC 
attorney Margie Phelps views the Snyder decision as an indication that such 
time, place, and manner regulations are also unconstitutional,33 she may be 
misguided.  As UCLA law professor and constitutional scholar Eugene 
Volokh put it, “That’s a little too optimistic from her perspective.”34 
This article now turns to four ways in which the Snyder opinion either 
eliminated or avoided other important issues. 
A. Focusing Only on the First Amendment, Not the Underlying Torts 
The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, along with several other free-speech 
organizations, filed amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to resolve the 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See id. at 1218 (noting that forty-four states, including Maryland and the federal 
government, have adopted such statutes, and observing that “[t]o the extent these laws are 
content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this 
case”). 
 32. See id. (noting that “Maryland’s law, however, was not in effect at the time of the 
events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as 
those before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional”). 
 33. See Andy Marso, Funeral Protestors Vow to Fight Picketing Curbs, BALT. SUN, 
Mar. 5, 2011, at 7A (describing how Margie Phelps believes the Supreme Court’s ruling will 
help the WBC in its legal attacks on such funeral buffer-zone statutes). 
 34. Jeff Frantz, Unpopular Victory for Free Speech, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), 
Mar. 3, 2011, at A1. 
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case in favor of the WBC solely on the underlying tort claims.35  In 
particular, attorney Joshua Wheeler asserted, on behalf of the Thomas 
Jefferson Center, that Albert Snyder could not, given the facts of the case, 
prove or otherwise satisfy the necessary elements of the two torts—
intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion— on 
which he had prevailed before a Maryland jury: 
This elemental absence provides grounds for resolving the case 
without addressing whether the Phelps’ expression is protected 
under the First Amendment.  In such circumstances, this Court 
adheres to a self-imposed doctrine of judicial restraint by 
avoiding the adjudication of constitutional questions—even if 
properly presented by the record—if another ground exists to 
decide the case.36 
In short, Wheeler argued that “the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
counsels that this case be resolved exclusively on the basis of Maryland tort 
law.”37   This argument was not pulled out of thin air; it was derived from 
Judge Dennis Shedd’s concurrence in the Fourth Circuit’s September 2009 
opinion in favor of the WBC defendants.38  Judge Shedd opined: 
Although I agree with the majority that the judgment below must 
be reversed, I would do so on different grounds.  As I explain 
below, I would hold that Snyder failed to prove at trial sufficient 
evidence to support the jury verdict on any of his tort claims. 
Because the appeal can be decided on this nonconstitutional 
basis, I would not reach the First Amendment issue addressed by 
the majority.39 
On the intrusion cause of action, Shedd noted that “[t]he Phelps [sic] 
never intruded upon a private place because their protest occurred at all 
times in a public place that was designated by the police and located 
approximately 1,000 feet from the funeral.  Further, the Phelps never 
confronted Snyder, and Snyder admits he could not see the protest.”40  As 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free 
Expression et al. in Support of Respondents at 39, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2010) 
(No. 09-751). 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring), aff’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 39. Id. at 227. 
 40. Id. at 230. 
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for the so-called “epic” posted by the WBC on its website, Shedd observed 
that Albert Snyder “learned of the ‘epic’ during an Internet search, and 
upon finding it he chose to read it.  By doing so, any interference with 
Snyder’s purported interest in seclusion was caused by Snyder himself 
rather than the Phelps.”41  With regard to the cause of action for IIED, 
Judge Shedd would have held that the conduct of the WBC defendants did 
not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior necessary to prove 
the IIED tort.42 
Justice Roberts, however, deftly dodged any analysis of the two 
underlying torts in Snyder.  He offered the following footnote by way of 
explanation: 
One judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that Snyder 
had failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial to support a 
jury verdict on any of his tort claims.  The Court of Appeals 
majority determined that the picketers had “voluntarily waived” 
any such contention on appeal.  Like the court below, we 
proceed on the unexamined premise that respondents’ speech 
was tortious.43 
This footnote made it clear that the Supreme Court’s decision would turn 
solely on First Amendment grounds and forgo any consideration of the tort 
claims that gave rise to the First Amendment issues in the first place.  The 
limited nature of the opinion was also clear in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
framing of the issue in the first paragraph: “[t]he question presented is 
whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 231. 
 42. See id. at 232. Judge Shedd explained: 
Snyder asserts that the protest was extreme and outrageous because the funeral 
was disrupted by having the procession re-routed; his grieving process was 
disrupted by his having to worry about his daughters observing the Phelps’ 
protest; and the Phelps’ messages on their protest signs were focused on his 
family.  As earlier noted, the protest was confined to a public area under 
supervision and regulation of local law enforcement and did not disrupt the 
church service.  Although reasonable people may disagree about the 
appropriateness of the Phelps’ protest, this conduct simply does not satisfy the 
heavy burden required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
under Maryland law.  Further, to the extent Snyder asserts the “epic” as a basis 
for this tort, I would find the “epic,” which the district court found to be non-
defamatory as a matter of law, is not sufficient to support a finding of extreme 
and outrageous conduct. 
Id. 
 43. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 n.2 (citation omitted). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
120 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:111 
 
 
liability for their speech in this case.”44 
Close observers of the Court will note that this rather generic framing of 
the issue deviates from the three official questions the Supreme Court 
established when it granted certiorari.45  In other words, the Chief Justice 
re-framed and distilled multiple issues down to a single one—a lone 
question that ultimately was resolved in uniform fashion by eight of the 
nine justices. 
B. Eliminating the “Epic” from the Analysis 
The Snyder case involved two different speech components: 1) the actual 
protest involving signs hoisted by members of the WBC near the funeral for 
Matthew Snyder; and 2) the Internet-posted “epic” on the WBC’s website.  
Chief Justice Roberts and the majority, however, focused exclusively on the 
former, dismissing the latter with a single footnote: 
A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a 
message on Westboro’s Web site discussing the picketing and 
containing religiously oriented denunciations of the Snyders, 
interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations.  Snyder discovered 
the posting, referred to by the parties as the “epic,” during an 
Internet search for his son’s name.  The epic is not properly 
before us and does not factor in our analysis.  Although the epic 
was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts below, 
Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari.46 
Although Chief Justice Roberts cited Rule 14.1(g) of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to support the Court’s decision to 
ignore the “epic”,47 the fact is that discussion of the “epic” was raised and 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 1213. 
 45. As stated on the U.S. Supreme Court’s official website: 
Three questions are presented: 1. Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell apply 
to a private person versus another private person concerning a private matter?  
2. Does the First Amendment’s freedom of speech tenet trump the First 
Amendment's freedom of religion and peaceful assembly?  3. Does an 
individual attending a family member’s funeral constitute a captive audience 
who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication? 
Question Presented, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/09-
00751qp.pdf.  
 46. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 n.1. 
 47. See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(g), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010 
RulesoftheCourt.pdf (requiring that a petition for a writ of certiorari contain “[a] concise 
statement of the case setting out the facts material to consideration of the questions 
presented”). 
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addressed at oral argument on October 6, 2010.48  In response to 
questioning by Justice Antonin Scalia, Snyder’s attorney Sean Summers 
explained that the “epic” “was essentially a recap of the funeral protest 
itself.”49  He added that “we focused on the personal, targeted comments in 
the epic when we presented our evidence.”50  Summers stated that the 
“epic” would have supported a cause of action, even if there had not been a 
funeral protest, because of “the personal, targeted epithets directed at the 
Snyder family.”51  
Consideration of the “epic” clearly would have complicated the Court’s 
analysis.  As suggested above in attorney Summers’ response to Justice 
Scalia, while none of the signs carried by members of the WBC near the 
funeral mentioned either Albert or Matthew Snyder personally, but merely 
offered what might best be characterized as generic hate-speech such as 
“God Hates Fags”52 and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,”53 the “epic” was a 
much more personal attack for several reasons.  First, it was entitled “The 
Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”54  Second, as described by 
U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett, quoting WBC member Shirley L. 
Phelps-Roper, the “epic” stated “that Albert Snyder and his ex-wife ‘taught 
Matthew to defy his creator,’ ‘raised him for the devil,’ and ‘taught him that 
God was a liar.’”55  Such attacks on a private-figure plaintiff (private, at 
least, in the mind of Justice Alito56) would have raised a much closer 
question on the IIED tort, given that the Supreme Court’s 1988 ruling in 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell applied only to public figures and public 
officials.57 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Oral Argument at 3-5, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-751.pdf. 
 49. Id. at 4.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 5. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th 
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
 55. Id.  
 56. See infra Part II.C (addressing the Court’s analysis, or lack thereof, of the private-
figure status of Albert Snyder). 
 57. See 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (concluding that “public figures and public officials may 
not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of 
publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice’” (emphasis added)). 
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Justice Alito objected to the majority’s elimination of the “epic” from its 
consideration.  The “epic,” Alito wrote in dissent, “is not a distinct claim 
but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability for the 
claims now before this Court.  The protest and the epic are parts of a single 
course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.”58  In a stinging rebuke, Alito added that “the Court’s 
refusal to consider the ‘epic’ contrasts sharply with its willingness to take 
notice of Westboro’s protest activities at other times and locations.”59  That 
said, of course, focusing judicial attention on a single speech incident—
namely, the funeral protest itself—provides for doctrinal clarity rather than 
the possible ambiguity that might have been rendered by the convolution of 
two distinct speech incidents. 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized that the 
Court’s opinion does not “say anything about Internet postings.”60  One is 
left to wonder whether Justice Breyer might have joined Justice Alito’s 
dissent had the Court addressed the “epic”.  Breyer wrote that “[w]hile I 
agree with the Court’s conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of 
public concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop 
at that point.”61  Citing Justice Alito’s dissent, Justice Breyer observed: 
The dissent requires us to ask whether our holding unreasonably 
limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress—to 
the point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a 
public matter) might launch a verbal assault upon B, a private 
person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B’s 
private life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B 
severe emotional harm.  Does our decision leave the State 
powerless to protect the individual against invasions of, e.g., 
personal privacy, even in the most horrendous of such 
circumstances?62 
As described earlier in this section, the “epic” certainly falls much more 
in line with such a direct verbal assault than do the signs carried by 
members of the WBC.  Breyer’s posing of the question above, coupled with 
his emphasis of the fact that the Court’s opinion never examined the “epic,” 
may indicate that he would have viewed the “epic” quite differently from 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 n.15 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/1
2012] TOO NARROW OF A HOLDING? 123 
 
 
the protest near the funeral had the Court actually addressed it.  One cannot 
be certain, but the fact that Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence that 
specifically gave rhetorical cover to Justice Alito’s dissent, would seem to 
make such a possibility more than purely speculative. 
C. Avoiding Analysis of the Status of Albert Snyder as a Private Figure 
Although Justice Alito opened his dissent by emphasizing that “Albert 
Snyder is not a public figure,”63 the status of the plaintiff as either a private 
or public figure apparently made little or no difference to the majority.  The 
majority instead emphasized the nature of the speech over the status of the 
plaintiff:  “Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable 
for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public 
or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”64  
In declining to address the status of Albert Snyder as a private or public 
figure, the majority ignored the call of some legal scholars who had 
analyzed the lower-court rulings in Snyder.  Most notably, perhaps, 
Professor W. Wat Hopkins of Virginia Tech University argued in a 2010 
article that: 
The distinction has been made between public and private 
persons in libel law, and private persons—even when involved 
in matters of public concern—do not face a heightened burden of 
proof in order to prevail in libel actions.  The same buffer should 
apply in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  It does not advance the cause of free expression to 
allow outrageous attacks on private persons who have not 
entered the fray of public debate.65 
Hopkins contended that Albert Snyder was a private figure and that the 
Supreme Court should take advantage of the Snyder case as a propitious 
opportunity to cabin and confine the Court’s 1988 holding in Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell66 to only those IIED cases involving public 
figures.67  As Hopkins eloquently put it: “Albert Snyder was not embroiled 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. at 1215 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 65. W. Wat Hopkins, Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 149, 191 (2010). 
 66. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 67. In Falwell, the Supreme Court protected an advertisement parody published in the 
November 1983 issue of Hustler magazine suggesting that the Rev. Jerry Falwell, the head 
of the Moral Majority, lost his virginity during an incestuous encounter with his mother in an 
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in debate over a matter of public concern when attacked by the Westboro 
Baptist Church—he was a mourning father doing no more than attempting 
to bury his son in peace.”68  Hopkins thus concluded that “[t]he boundaries 
of intentional infliction cases should be narrowly drawn, but the Snyder 
case falls into even the most narrow of those boundaries, and the Supreme 
Court should say so.”69  Unfortunately for Hopkins and those who agree 
with his viewpoint, only Justice Alito did say so. 
Justice Alito stressed in his dissent that Albert Snyder was a private 
figure and that this designation should directly influence the outcome of the 
case.  He wrote that although members of the WBC “may picket peacefully 
in countless locations . . . [i]t does not follow . . . that they may 
intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of 
intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make 
no contribution to public debate.”70 
Noting the Court’s 1988 decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
Justice Alito emphasized that while that case “did involve an IIED 
claim . . . the plaintiff there was a public figure, and the Court did not 
suggest that its holding would also apply in a case involving a private 
figure.”71  He added that “[u]nless a caricature of a public figure can 
reasonably be interpreted as stating facts that may be proved to be wrong, 
the caricature does not have the same potential to wound as a personal 
verbal assault on a vulnerable private figure.”72 
Thus, for Alito, the status of the plaintiff as a private person played a 
pivotal role in the outcome of the case. 
D. Focusing Only on the Public Aspects of the Speech and Its Location 
Although the majority declined to address the status of the plaintiff, it 
clearly emphasized what it concluded were two very “public” factual 
                                                                                                                 
outhouse and that he got drunk before preaching.  Id. at 48.  In ruling for Hustler and its 
pornographic publisher, Larry Flynt, in the face of Falwell’s successful IIED claim before a 
home-state Virginia jury, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the Court that 
[p]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at 
issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement 
of fact which was made with “actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. 
Id. at 56.  
 68. Hopkins, supra note 65, at 192. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
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aspects of the case:  the content of the speech and the location in which it 
took place.  Chief Justice Roberts, who early in the opinion took pains to 
make it clear that the WBC members, acting in compliance with police 
instructions, were standing on a small patch of public land next to a public 
street and about 1000 feet away from the church where the funeral for 
Matthew Snyder was being held,73 wrote that “[g]iven that Westboro’s 
speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is 
entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment.  Such speech 
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”74 
With both the content and location of the speech deemed public, the 
outcome of Snyder was, in the parlance of our times, a done deal.  All that 
was left for Chief Justice Roberts to do was to insert the often-quoted, 
almost obligatory maxim from another offensive-speech case, Texas v. 
Johnson,75 that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”76  Like Cohen v. California77 forty years earlier, Snyder 
became just another routine case about offensive speech regarding a matter 
of public concern, conveyed in a public location from which an individual 
could easily exercise the constitutionally adequate self-help remedy of 
looking away.78  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Cohen in support of 
the proposition that, given the 1000-foot distance in a public location that 
separated Albert Snyder from the speech of the WBC members, the Snyder 
case did not involve a captive audience scenario.79 
Although this article thus far has intimated criticism of Chief Justice 
Roberts for too narrowly confining the issue in Snyder, Roberts should be 
praised for laying out three criteria which will allow future courts a degree 
of certainty in deciding whether the content of speech involves a matter of 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion). 
 74. Id. at 1219.  
 75. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 76. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414). 
 77. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 78. The high court wrote in Cohen that “[t]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse could 
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes” 
away from Paul Robert Cohen’s jacket bearing the written message, “Fuck the Draft.”  Id. at 
21. 
 79. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (”The ability of government, consonant with the 
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent 
upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially 
intolerable manner.”) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
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public concern.  Roberts wrote that content, context, and form are 
instrumental in determining, when viewing the record as a whole, if the 
speech at issue centers on a matter of public concern.80  Applying those 
factors to the speech at issue in Snyder, Roberts wrote: 
The placards read “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” 
“America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God 
for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” 
“Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed Just 
Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” 
“Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates 
You.” . . . While these messages may fall short of refined social 
or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political 
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate 
of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals 
involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import.  
The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on those issues, 
in a manner designed . . . to reach as broad a public audience as 
possible.81 
As for the context of the speech, the fact that it took place at a funeral did 
not instantly transform it into a matter of private concern.82  Roberts wrote 
that “Westboro’s signs, displayed on public land next to a public street, 
reflect the fact that the church [the WBC] finds much to condemn in 
modern society. . . . and the funeral setting does not alter that conclusion.”83 
Therefore, although a funeral often is a private event that is conducted near 
public spaces like streets and sidewalks, the Court avoided a comprehensive 
explanation of why the privacy of a funeral is trumped by the ‘public 
concern’ content of WBC’s speech. 
In summary, once the IIED and intrusion tort questions were discarded, 
once the “epic” was rendered irrelevant, and once the status of the plaintiff 
was ignored, the focus of the Snyder case was confined solely to the First 
Amendment rights of WBC to engage in speech about matters of public 
concern in a public location. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 1217. 
 81. Id. at 1216-17.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 1217. 
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Snyder v. Phelps proved to be a classic First Amendment precipice case 
in which the rights of free speech are pushed to the very edge of the cliff of 
censorship84 before the Court, as it has done multiple times before in cases 
like Cohen, Johnson, and Falwell, sweeps in to save the day for even the 
most offensive expression.  The Snyder decision, as First Amendment 
attorney Lloyd Lunceford put it, thus merely fell in order with “an 
established line of cases that ‘gives a very high degree of First Amendment 
protection to speech on matters of public concern.’”85   
A. Judicial Minimalism 
With the facts and issues so constrained by Chief Justice Roberts,86 the 
result in Snyder was “inescapable.”87  The result was a good example of 
what constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein calls “judicial minimalism,” 
under which the guiding philosophy is that “judges should take narrow, 
theoretically unambitious steps, at least when they lack the experience or 
the information to rule broadly or ambitiously.”88 
This is not, of course, to say the narrow decision in Snyder was either 
wrong or bad.  In fact the opposite is true.  The decision’s closing paragraph 
reinforced the notion that a majoritarian heckler’s veto, be it in the form of 
tort causes of action (as in Snyder) or government censorship, is anathema 
to the First Amendment.89  Roberts wrote that speech 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Cf. David Savage, Justices Side with Funeral Picketers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, 
at A9 (observing that the case “pressed the outer limits of free speech”). 
 85. Joe Gyan, Jr., Analysts Agree Law Protects Protests, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
La.), Mar. 5, 2011, at A1. 
 86. See supra Part II (describing four different ways in which the Court arguably 
narrowed the facts and issue on which it had to focus). 
 87. Editorial, The Hard Facts of Freedom, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Ga.), Mar. 6, 
2011, at C4. 
 88. Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2868 
(2007). 
 89. As one federal appellate court recently encapsulated the doctrine of a heckler’s veto: 
Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or other 
unprivileged retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot lawfully 
be suppressed because of that conduct.  Otherwise free speech could be stifled 
by the speaker’s opponents’ mounting a riot, even though, because the speech 
had contained no fighting words, no reasonable person would have been moved 
to a riotous response. 
Zamecnick v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011); see 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133 n.1 (1966) (observing that “[p]articipants in an 
orderly demonstration in a public place are not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked 
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[c]an stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and 
sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts 
before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.  
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even 
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle 
public debate.  That choice requires that we shield Westboro 
from tort liability for its picketing in this case.90 
In other words, just as a federal appellate court upheld the First 
Amendment right of a group of Nazis to march during the 1970s in 
Holocaust-survivor laden Skokie, Illinois,91 so too does it now protect the 
right of the WBC to protest in a public place, without fear that the 
audience’s reaction to its offensive message will be allowed to squelch it.   
The decision also reinforces retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
admonition in the cross-burning case of Virginia v. Black that “the hallmark 
of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas 
that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or 
discomforting.”92 
Furthermore, the outcome in Snyder should be lauded to the extent that it 
embraces First Amendment scholar Lee Bollinger’s notion of a “tolerant 
society.”93  For instance, for Bollinger, protecting the expression of Nazi 
beliefs is pivotal because it reinforces American society’s commitment to 
tolerance.94  As Bollinger writes, “free speech involves a special act of 
carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the 
purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control 
feelings evoked by a host of social encounters.”95 
The question posed, however, in this article—whether the Court in 
Snyder rendered too narrow of holding—taps into the issue of whether, in 
                                                                                                                 
except by the fact of the constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their critics 
might react with disorder or violence”). 
 90. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 91. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that “[t]he 
result we have reached is dictated by the fundamental proposition that if these civil rights are 
to remain vital for all, they must protect not only those society deems acceptable, but also 
those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects and despises” (emphasis added)). 
 92. 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 93. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
 94. See Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an “Easy Case” and Free 
Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617, 629-31 (1982). 
 95. BOLLINGER, supra note 93, at 10. 
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the process of rendering a clear and yet somewhat simplistic victory for 
freedom of expression, the majority gave short shrift to other important 
issues? 
For instance, one of the three official questions presented for analysis by 
the Supreme Court in Snyder was: “Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell 
apply to a private person versus another private person concerning a private 
matter?”96  The opinion of the Court, however, never squarely states either 
that Falwell extends or does not extend to a private person.  The majority, 
although certainly not Justice Samuel Alito in dissent,97 simply never 
addressed this issue in straightforward fashion. 
Likewise, the Court could have dealt with a topic that will continue to 
arise in the future—personally abusive postings on the Internet targeting 
private individuals.  Instead, it chose to forego any consideration of the so-
called online “epic”.98  The issue is exceedingly complex, involving speech 
in a relatively new medium:  speech which an individual, like Albert 
Snyder, must seek out or have called to his attention before being exposed 
to it.  But the Court provided no guidance to lower courts on this issue.99 
There is nothing inherently wrong with a narrow holding, especially 
when an area of law is nascent.  For instance, in its 2010 opinion in City of 
Ontario v. Quon, involving the assertion by a government employer of the 
right to read text messages sent and received on an employer-owned pager 
issued to an employee,100 Justice Anthony Kennedy defended the narrow 
holding in that case by explaining that the “Court must proceed with care 
when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in 
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government 
employer.”101  Given “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication 
and information transmission,” Kennedy cautioned that “[i]t is not so clear 
that courts at present are on so sure a ground.  Prudence counsels caution 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (setting forth the three official questions 
the Supreme Court stated that it would address when it granted the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in Snyder). 
 97. Supra Part II.C. 
 98. See supra Part II.B. 
 99. This scenario seems particularly likely to arise in cases involving minors who create 
websites or other online platforms that mock, disparage or otherwise attack other minors.  
Schools are now addressing this problem involving off-campus postings by students that 
attack other students.  See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (involving a minor who created a MySpace.com page that “was largely dedicated 
to ridiculing a fellow student”). 
 100. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 2629. 
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before the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching 
premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations 
enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication 
devices.”102 
Perhaps Justice Kennedy’s argument helps explain why the majority in 
Snyder was, beyond the Rules of Court issue noted earlier,103 reticent to 
address the Internet-based issue posed by the WBC’s “epic”.  But, unlike 
privacy rights on emerging technologies, basic principles of tort law and 
First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence are much more established and 
the Court could have broadened its focus to examine the “epic” and whether 
or not its holding in the IIED case of Falwell extends to private-figure 
plaintiffs. 
B. Consensus Building by Chief Justice Roberts 
Obviously, the simpler the issue, the easier it is to address, but the less, 
in turn, the end result accomplishes in terms of advancing the law or in 
giving guidance to lower courts.  Until the current justices’ notes and 
papers are released, we will not know for certain whether any brokering 
went on to reach the result in Snyder v. Phelps.  Did Roberts need to strip 
away other issues in order to bring seven other members of the Court along 
with him? 
A recent article in the Yale Law Journal observed that “[c]ritics have 
charged that the Roberts Court’s emphasis on narrow holdings limited to 
specific factual circumstances undermines the Court’s guidance function for 
lower courts and legislators alike.”104  This has proven particularly true in 
the area of First Amendment jurisprudence.  Using the Supreme Court’s 
2007 ruling in the student-speech case of Morse v. Frederick105 as an 
example, Professor Frederick Schauer asserts that 
we have seen an increase in narrow and fact-specific rulings, 
rulings that may in theory produce the right outcome for the 
particular case before the Court, but which in practice gain little 
if anything in accuracy but nevertheless entail the cost of 
providing virtually no assistance for lower courts expected to 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra Part II.B. 
 104. William J. Rinner, Roberts Court Jurisprudence and Legislative Enactment Costs, 
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 177 (2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-
journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/roberts-court-jurisprudence-and-legislative-enactment-
costs. 
 105. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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make their decisions in light of what the Supreme Court has said, 
and for officials and citizens desiring to know what the law is as 
they plan their actions.106 
Criticizing Chief Justice Roberts in Morse, Professor Schauer argues that 
when 
[f]aced with an opportunity to say something helpful to and for 
those in the trenches, the Court not only selected a highly 
unrepresentative case for its first foray into the area in nineteen 
years, but it also decided the case on narrow grounds, and in 
doing so focused on those dimensions of the case least likely to 
be found in the conflicts that bedevil school administrators and 
lower courts on almost a daily basis.107 
Thus, while the result in Snyder frustrates those members of the general 
public, including Albert Snyder,108 who find it hard to believe that such 
offensive speech should be allowed to trump the tranquility and solemnity 
of a funeral,109 perhaps it is First Amendment scholars who should be the 
most frustrated by a decision that could have broken much new legal 
ground and offered guidance to lower courts but was, instead, framed so 
narrowly as to leave First Amendment jurisprudence all but untouched.  
While the phrase “cop out” quickly comes to the mind of this author, he 
nonetheless must acknowledge that, from a pro-free speech perspective, the 
Court neither reversed nor overruled a significant body of precedent in 
favor of erring on the side of free speech.  In other words, perhaps the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207. 
 107. Id. at 209-10. 
 108. Mr. Snyder stated that, upon learning of the Supreme Court’s ruling, “[m]y first 
thought was that eight justices didn’t have the common sense that God gave a goat.” Andrew 
Shaw, Marine’s Father Responds to Supreme Court Decision on Westboro Baptist, YORK 
DISPATCH (Pa.), Mar. 3. 2011. 
 109. As Kansas Attorney General Derek Schmidt put it in a statement released shortly 
after the opinion was rendered, “Today’s decision is a disappointment for Kansans who have 
endured for so long the embarrassment brought upon our state by the shameful conduct of 
the Westboro Baptist Church.  Our hearts go out to the Snyder family whose pain and 
distress were at issue in this case.”  News Release, Statement of Attorney General Derek 
Schmidt on Supreme Court Decision in Snyder v. Phelps (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://ag.ks.gov/media-center/news-releases/2011/09/29/statement-of-attorney-general-
derek-schmidt-on-supreme-court-decision-in-em-snyder-v.-phelps-em-; see also Fred Mann, 
Ruling Dismays Vets' Supporters, Kan. Lawmakers, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 3, 2011, at A1 
(describing angry reaction to the decision).  
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holding needed to be whittled down to fit within a public-speech-in-a-
public-place paradigm so as to guarantee a First Amendment victory. 
When Chief Justice Roberts brought seven other Justices on board with 
him in the previous term to deliver another First Amendment victory in the 
crush-video case of United States v. Stevens,110 he again made it clear that 
the ruling in question was narrow:  “We therefore need not and do not 
decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of 
extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional.  We hold only that § 48 is 
not so limited but is instead substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid 
under the First Amendment.”111  Applying the overbreadth doctrine to 
invalidate the crush-video statute on its face helped avoid what might 
otherwise have been a more complex as-applied challenge requiring the 
application of the strict scrutiny doctrine112 to examine a law that was 
drafted to target crush videos but was applied in Stevens to prosecute a 
person for selling dog-fight videos.  As in Snyder, where disregarding facts 
about the “epic” allowed Chief Justice Roberts to set aside the issue 
implicated by it,113 the Chief Justice, in Stevens, reached for procedural 
problems and reasoned—over the objection of Justice Alito  in dissent—
that “here no as-applied claim has been preserved.  Neither court below 
construed Stevens’ briefs as adequately developing a separate attack on a 
defined subset of the statute’s applications (say, dogfighting videos).”114  
Justice Alito objected to the use of the overbreadth doctrine to resolve the 
issue because, as he noted, overbreadth is generally used “only as a last 
resort.”115 
C. Justice Alito’s Dissent 
Justice Alito’s dissents in both Stevens and Snyder proved to be 
somewhat of a harbinger of things to come when the Supreme Court in June 
2011 ruled on the violent video game case of Brown v. Entertainment 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing Stevens). 
 111. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
 112. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (writing 
that a “content-based speech restriction” is permissible “only if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” 
which requires that the law in question “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
Government interest”); Sable Comm. Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (writing 
that the government may “regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order 
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 113. See supra Part II.B. 
 114. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 n.3. 
 115. Id. at 1594 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Merchants Association.116   During oral argument in that case in November 
2010, Justice Alito sounded incredulous when he queried Paul Smith, 
counsel for the video game industry: “Your argument is that there is 
nothing that a State can do to limit minors’ access to the most violent, 
sadistic, graphic video game that can be developed.  That’s your 
argument?”117  Ultimately, Justice Alito issued a concurring opinion in 
Brown that agreed with majority’s decision to strike down California’s 
violent video game law,118 but he did so only because he found the law too 
vague and certainly not because he was enamored of the speech in 
question.119  Alito made it evident that he objected to the speech California 
sought to regulate,120 and he lauded California’s effort to control it as 
“pioneering.”121 
Lest one think that Justice Alito, given his dissents in both Stevens and 
Snyder, will always rule against the right to engage in what some might 
consider to be offensive speech, one need only look back to his 2001 Third 
Circuit opinion in Saxe v. State College Area School District.122  In that 
case, Justice Alito—perhaps ironically, given his statements above in 
Stevens about overbreadth challenges—used the overbreadth doctrine to 
strike down the speech code of a public high school district.  The purpose 
of the code was to target “unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning 
                                                                                                                 
 116. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 117. Oral Argument at 48, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, Nov. 2, 2010 (No. 
08-1448), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts. 
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 118. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring) (writing that “[a]lthough the 
California statute is well intentioned, its terms are not framed with the precision that the 
Constitution demands, and I therefore agree with the Court that this particular law cannot be 
sustained”). 
 119. Id. at 2746 (concluding that the law “fails to provide the fair notice that the 
Constitution requires”). 
 120. For instance, Justice Alito seemed to go to great lengths to make it clear the speech 
was, at least to him, exceedingly graphic: 
In some of these games, the violence is astounding.  Victims by the dozens are 
killed with every imaginable implement, including machine guns, shotguns, 
clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and chainsaws.  Victims are dismembered, 
decapitated, disemboweled, set on fire, and chopped into little pieces.  They cry 
out in agony and beg for mercy.  Blood gushes, splatters, and pools. Severed 
body parts and gobs of human remains are graphically shown.  In some games, 
points are awarded based, not only on the number of victims killed, but on the 
killing technique employed. 
Id. at 2749. 
 121. Id. at 2742.  
 122. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, 
gestures, physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the 
display or circulation of written material or pictures.”123  Adding further 
irony is the fact that the plaintiffs in Saxe were somewhat similar, at least in 
their beliefs, to the members of the WBC.  Alito noted that the plaintiffs 
“believe, and their religion teaches, that homosexuality is a sin.  Plaintiffs 
further believe that they have a right to speak out about the sinful nature 
and harmful effects of homosexuality.  Plaintiffs also feel compelled by 
their religion to speak out on other topics, especially moral issues.”124 
Ultimately, as Professor Cass Sunstein observes: 
The choice between narrow and wide rulings must itself be made 
on a case-by-case basis; no rule is adequate to the task.  Where 
the Court’s decision must be applied in many contexts, and when 
the issue frequently recurs, the argument for width may well be 
irresistible.  But where the issue arises infrequently, and when 
the Court lacks the information that would enable it to produce a 
wide rule in which it has much confidence, the argument for 
narrowness is quite strong.125 
IV. Conclusion 
Given the likelihood that the WBC will engage in future personal attacks 
on private figures on its website, as it did with the “epic,” and given that the 
Internet is now littered with personal attacks against private individuals, the 
argument for narrowness in Snyder was misguided.  The Court needs to 
address the First Amendment limitations on IIED claims premised on 
Internet-posted expression that attacks private figures and also blends those 
attacks with speech on matters of public concern.  This will not be nearly as 
easy of an issue to resolve as was the narrowly framed question in Snyder. 
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